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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE EMITTERS IN PAKOOTAS V. TECK
COMINCO METALS, LTD. ARE ON CLOUD NINE:
NINTH CIRCUIT DETERMINES THAT
AIRBORNE EMISSIONS ARE NOT
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF CERCLA LIABILITY
“Yes, and how many times can a man turn his head? And
pretend that he just doesn’t see? The answer, my friend, is
blowin’ in the wind. The answer is blowin’ in the wind.”
-Bob Dylan1
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, companies could release hazardous waste from
their production facilities directly into the environment.2  It was not
until the late 1970s that the nation became aware of the detrimen-
tal environmental effects of such activity.3  In 1978, when tons of
toxic industrial waste buried by the Hooker Company in the 1940s
began bubbling up in the backyards of residents of Niagara Falls,
New York, it became clear that the government needed to establish
a way to hold emitting parties accountable.4  Approximately thirty
years ago, Congress enacted The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which pro-
vided the legal basis to hold hazardous waste emitters accountable
for the remediation costs of their damage to the environment.5
Since its enactment, personally responsible parties (PRPs) have
spent millions of dollars cleaning up hazardous waste sites.6  CER-
1. BOB DYLAN, BLOWIN’ IN THE WIND (Columbia Recording Studios) (1962).
2. For a further discussion of the reasons for the enactment of CERCLA, see
infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
3. For a further discussion of the reasons for the enactment of CERCLA, see
infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
4. See Gilbert Cruz, Top 10 Environmental Disasters, TIME (May 3, 2010), http://
content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/
0,28804,1986457_1986501_1986441,00.html (providing background on Love Ca-
nal disaster); see also Associated Press, ‘Love Canal’ still oozing poison 35 years later,
NEW YORK POST (Nov. 2, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/11/02/love-canal-still-
oozing-poison-35-years-later/ (describing need for government intervention).
5. For a further discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 42-58 and accompany-
ing text.
6. For a further discussion of CERCLA, see infra notes 42-58 and accompany-
ing text.
(283)
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CLA has had far-reaching liability and holds emitters accountable
for years following their emitting activity.7
Numerous PRPs have been held liable for remediation costs
when their activity involved “disposing” of hazardous wastes directly
into the air or water; it was unclear, however, whether aerial emis-
sions, which later settle on land or water, were within the purview of
CERCLA liability.8  In July 2016, the Ninth Circuit addressed this
question.9  A Native American tribe brought suit against the opera-
tors of a smelter plant located in Canada.10  After years of successful
litigation that resulted in finding Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. liable
for solid hazardous emissions, the latest decision discussed whether
Teck’s smokestacks’ aerial emissions, which float in the air and later
settle on the water, should also be included within this liability.11
The court discussed its reliance on precedent and the persuasive
arguments therein, and ultimately held that aerial emissions are not
“disposed” of by PRPs in such a way that would hold those parties
liable under CERCLA.12
First, Section II of this Casenote discusses the underlying facts
and the extensive procedural history of Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Met-
als, Ltd.13  Section III of this Note discusses CERCLA, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act (CAA),
and pertinent cases discussing various interpretations of these
acts.14  Next, Section IV of this Note discusses the majority’s reason-
ing in Pakootas.15  Section V of this Note touches on the court’s in-
correct reliance on precedent, disregard for the broad remediation
purposes of the statute, and the creation of a “gap” in coverage be-
7. For a further discussion of the importance of Pakootas, see infra notes 9-12
and accompanying text.
8. For a further discussion on the background of Pakootas, see infra notes 18-
41 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion on the background of Pakootas, see infra notes 18-
41 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion on the background of Pakootas, see infra notes 18-
41 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion on the background of Pakootas, see infra notes 18-
41 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis, see infra notes 104-126 and
accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the facts of Pakootas, see infra notes 18-41 and
accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of important background information regarding
Pakootas, see infra notes 42-103 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the majority opinion in Pakootas, see infra notes
104-126 and accompanying text.
2
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol28/iss2/5
2017] HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE EMITTERS 285
tween the CAA and CERCLA.16  Lastly, Section VI of this Note ex-
amines the impact of the Pakootas court’s holding on hazardous
substance emitter’s liability, or lack thereof.17
II. FACTS
The defendant, Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd. (Teck), operated a
smelter plant located ten miles north of the United States-Canadian
border in Trail, British Columbia.18  Plaintiffs, the Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Tribes), owned a reservation
that borders the Upper Columbia River Site (UCR Site) and a por-
tion of the riverbed.19  In addition to the reservation site, the Tribes
maintain rights to resources located at the northern end of the
UCR Site and neighboring land.20
The Tribes and the state of Washington, as a plaintiff-inter-
venor, brought an action under CERCLA against Teck for cost re-
covery and natural resource damage, alleging Teck dumped “slag”
into the Columbia River from its smelter operations.21  Plaintiffs
then amended their complaint to include claims for aerial hazard-
ous substance emissions.22  According to the Plaintiffs, the emitted
substances traveled by air currents from the smelter stacks into the
UCR Site, which is located in the United States.23  After traveling
through the air, these emissions settled onto either land or water at
the UCR Site.24
16. For a further discussion of the issues with the Pakootas majority’s rationale,
see infra notes 127-159 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the potential implications of the Pakootas deci-
sion, see infra notes 160-186 and accompanying text.
18. 18. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 978 (9th Cir.
2016) (providing information regarding defendant party).  Smelting is the process
by which metal is heated to high temperatures in order to separate the metal from
any impurities. See Smelting, POLLUTION ISSUES, http://www.pollutionissues.com/
Re-Sy/Smelting.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) (defining smelting).  The waste
product of smelting includes both “slag” and “contaminant laden air emissions.”
See id.
19. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-0256-LRS, 2016 U.S.
Dist. WL 4258929, at *1 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (providing information regarding
plaintiff party).  The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation is “a sover-
eign Indian Tribe whose government is recognized by the United States.” See id.
20. See id. (providing context for how Tribes are affected by defendant’s
emissions).
21. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 978-79 (explaining premise of action).
22. See id. at 979 (explaining procedural posture).  The district court origi-
nally denied the plaintiff’s untimely leave to amend; it then, however, modified its
position and permitted the amendment. See id.
23. See id. (explaining plaintiff’s argument for imposing liability).
24. See id. (detailing plaintiff’s theory of hazardous substances transportation
to Columbia UCR Site).
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The emitted substances included “lead compounds, arsenic
compounds, cadmium compounds and mercury compounds.”25
These hazardous substances continuously affect “surface water and
ground water, upland areas, sediments, and the biological re-
sources [that] comprise the [UCR] Site.”26  Over time, these haz-
ardous substances, whether traveling through air or water,
congregate and cause built-up slag at the UCR Site.27  Slag can have
detrimental environmental effects, such as bioaccumulation, toxic-
ity problems in animal and plant life, erosion of fish gills, and
smothering of habitats.28  Further, humans regularly have direct
contact with the slag through traversing the beaches, inhaling the
airborne particles, and consuming the fish, agricultural crops, and
native plants that digest the contaminated water.29
Teck moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that CERCLA does
not impose liability when the hazardous substances are emitted into
the air rather than directly into water or land.30  In opposition, the
Plaintiffs argued that Teck “deposited” the hazardous substances
into the UCR Site by wind, thus meeting the definition of “disposal”
within CERCLA.31  The Plaintiffs cited several dictionary defini-
tions, all of which referenced the deposition of layers of substance
over time.32
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington rejected Teck’s argument and subsequently denied the
motion.33  Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v.
BNSF Railway Co. (CCAEJ),34 which held that “emitting diesel partic-
ulate matter into the air and allowing it to be ‘transported by wind
and air currents onto the land and water’ did not constitute ‘dispo-
sal’ of waste within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act [RCRA].”35  Teck subsequently filed a motion for re-
25. See id. (naming types of hazardous substances defendant allegedly
emitted).
26. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979 (explaining negative environmental impacts
from emissions).
27. See id. (discussing process for slag accumulation).
28. See id. at 980 (stating specifically harmful effects of accumulation).
29. See id. (discussing human exposure to effects of accumulation).
30. See id. (providing defendant’s argument for motion to strike).
31. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983 (explaining premise behind plaintiff’s
argument).
32. See id. (providing plaintiff’s support for argument).
33. See id. (noting district court’s denial of motion).
34. 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
35. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 980 (discussing important Ninth Circuit decision,
which immediately followed Pakootas).
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consideration, arguing that the CCAEJ court’s interpretation should
apply because of the cross-reference to RCRA’s definition of “dispo-
sal.”36  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington denied the motion, stating that Teck’s “disposal” of
emitted wastes occurred when the substances entered the land or
water at the UCR Site, as opposed to when the substances were re-
leased into the air.37
Because the issue of whether aerial emissions leading to the
disposal of hazardous substances into land or water are actionable
under CERCLA has never been addressed before, the Ninth Circuit
granted the district court’s certification of the issue for interlocu-
tory appeal.38  The Ninth Circuit granted permission to appeal, and
subsequently reversed and remanded.39  The Ninth Circuit relied
on precedent from Carson Harbor, Ltd. v. Unocal Corporation (Carson
Harbor),40 defining “deposit” akin to “putting down” or placement,
which consequently excluded aerial emissions from the purview of
CERCLA.41
III. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA
1. The Statute
CERCLA, also known as the Superfund, was enacted in 1980
and amended in 1986.42  This Act provides “strict liability for any
person found responsible for depositing hazardous substances in
such a way as to endanger human health or safety.”43  CERCLA was
passed in response to the discovery of a series of toxic waste sites
such as Love Canal.44  The purpose of CERCLA was to create a
36. See id. (discussing Teck’s argument for motion for reconsideration).
37. See id. (discussing district court’s consideration when issuing order).
38. See id. (explaining why district court certified issue for interlocutory
appeal).
39. See id. at 980 (providing appellate court’s holding).
40. 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
41. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983 (discussing court’s rationale).
42. See John L. Ropiequet, Environmental Law Litigation under CERCLA, 47 AM.
JUR. TRIALS 1 (1993) (providing background for CERCLA enactment).
43. See id. (providing language of statute to demonstrate expansive coverage).
44. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-380, EPA’s Estimated Costs
to Remediate Existing Sites Exceed Current Funding Levels, and More Sites Are Expected to
Be Added to the National Priorities List 10 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/310/304124.pdf (hereinafter referred to as “EPA’s Estimated Costs to Re-
mediate Existing Sites Exceed Current Funding Levels”) (providing context for
passage of CERCLA).  The Love Canal tragedy involved many years of toxic waste
dumping, which resulted in drastic harmful effects, such as the destruction of the
local environment and birth defects. See Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy,
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mechanism for responding to already existing contamination and
to shift the remediation costs from taxpayers to the parties who ulti-
mately benefit from such disposal.45  Under CERCLA, potentially
responsible parties (PRPs) are liable for either conducting cleanups
or reimbursing other parties, including relevant federal agencies,
who conduct cleanups on their behalf.46  Potentially responsible
parties comprise owners and operators of a site, as well as several
other parties.47
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for
carrying out the Superfund program.48  CERCLA authorizes the
EPA to fund cleanups using the Hazardous Substance Superfund,
which is a trust fund that was financed originally by taxes, but is now
financed by appropriations from general revenues.49  The process
begins when the state notifies the EPA of possible releases of haz-
ardous substances, which may pose a threat to human safety.50  The
EPA then utilizes a screening mechanism, known as the Hazard
Ranking System, to assess the potential threat to human life at the
site.51  If the site hits sufficiently high scores, it is eligible for propo-
sal to the National Priorities List (NPL).52  After a site is listed, the
EPA or a responsible party will begin the remediation process.53
Following cleanup, the EPA seeks reimbursement from the PRPs if
none have yet been identified by the EPA.54
Liability under CERCLA is expansive; even if a company dis-
posed of hazardous materials in accordance with statutes enacted at
that time in the past, but later is found to have created an environ-
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 1979), available at https://www.epa.gov/
aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy (providing background of Love Canal Tragedy).
45. See EPA’s Estimated Costs to Remediate Existing Sites Exceed Current
Funding Levels, supra note 44, at 10 (discussing purpose behind CERCLA enact-
ment); see also Ropiequet, Environmental Law Litigation under CERCLA, supra note
42 (discussing other rationale for CERCLA enactment).
46. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-330-F-11-003, CERCLA Liability and Lo-
cal Government Acquisitions and Other Activities (2011), available at https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/documents/local-gov-liab-acq-fs-rev.pdf (providing
process for recovering cleanup costs).
47. See id. (discussing potentially responsible parties).
48. See EPA’s Estimated Costs to Remediate Existing Sites Exceed Current
Funding Levels, supra note 44, at 3 (discussing administrative agency in charge of
enforcing CERCLA regulations).
49. See id. (discussing funding of remediation costs).
50. See id. at 2 (describing initial steps of CERCLA remediation procedure).
51. See id. (detailing CERCLA screening mechanism).
52. See id. (outlining requirements to qualify as hazardous site).
53. See EPA’s Estimated Costs to Remediate Existing Sites Exceed Current
Funding Levels, supra note 44, at 2 (detailing CERCLA remediation procedure).
54. See id. (detailing CERCLA remediation procedure).
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mental hazard, it will be liable for cleanup costs.55  In addition,
Congress has delegated broad authority to the EPA to determine
the criteria for listing hazardous waste, demonstrating Congress’
desire to allow the EPA to use its expertise in making this
determination.56
Within the group of PRPs who may be held liable for cleanup
costs are those persons “who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which hazardous
substances were disposed.”57  This provision allows current owners
of a contaminated property to seek remediation costs from previous
owners, even many years later.58
2. Cases
In Carson Harbor, the owner of a mobile home park brought an
action against the previous owners, operators of a petroleum pro-
duction facility, for reimbursement of costs associated with hazard-
ous material removal under several federal statutes, including
CERCLA.59  The environmental assessment found tar-like and slag
materials within the wetlands of the property, indicating that such
substances had been on the property for several decades prior to
becoming a mobile home park.60  Plaintiffs sought to recover the
remediation costs, totaling $285,000.61
The Ninth Circuit held that the fourth element of cost recov-
ery, which requires a showing that the defendant falls into one of
the four categories of persons subject to liability under CERCLA,
was not met.62  The plaintiffs had to establish that the defendants
55. See Ropiequet, Environmental Law Litigation under CERCLA, supra note 42
(explaining expansive coverage within CERCLA).  “CERCLA provides for strict lia-
bility once a PRP [potentially responsible party] is found to be responsible for a
release or threatened release of hazardous substance into the environment.  Issues
of fault, negligence, or compliance with prior existing law therefore are not rele-
vant.” See id.  CERCLA also applies retroactively. See id.
56. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1070
(D.C. App. 1994) (discussing congressional intent behind CERCLA).
57. See William B. Johnson, What Constitutes “Disposal” for Purposes of Owner or
Operator Liability Under § 107(a)(2) Of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2)), 136 A.L.R. FED. 117
(1997) (providing legal basis for CERCLA recovery suits).
58. See id. (expanding scope of coverage of statute).
59. Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir.
2001) (detailing background behind action).
60. See id. at 868 (providing factual findings).
61. See id. at 869 (discussing desired remediation cost recovery).
62. See id. at 874 (explaining court’s rationale for disposition).  The types of
“potentially responsible parties” include:
7
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“disposed” of hazardous materials.63  The court relied upon the
plain meaning in the statute, which defines disposal as “the dis-
charge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of
any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water . . . .
“64  The court held that the gradual, passive migration of the haz-
ardous substances through the soil did not comport with the listed
activities defined under disposal.65  In addition, most of the activi-
ties included in the definition require active conduct, with the ex-
ception of “spilling” or “leaking.”66  Including passive migration of
hazardous substances essentially eliminates the innocent landowner
defense for subsequent purchasers of property.67
B. RCRA
1. The Statute
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), en-
acted in 1976, is a waste management program that gives the EPA
the authority to establish regulations to maintain a system of solid
waste control.68  Subtitle D of the RCRA governs the regulation of
non-hazardous solid waste, which includes the banning of open
dumping and regulations regarding the operation of municipal
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section—
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for . . .
42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1-4) (providing language of statute).
63. See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 874 (detailing court’s rationale regarding
establishing liability).
64. Id. at 875 (citing language from CERCLA).
65. See id. at 879 (providing exceptions to “disposal”).
66. See id. (reviewing rationale for exception).
67. See id. at 893 (discussing holding’s potential repercussions).
68. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Overview, U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/rcra/resource-conservation-
and-recovery-act-rcra-overview (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) (providing background of
RCRA enactment).
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waste and landfills.69  Subtitle C of the RCRA governs the regula-
tion of hazardous solid waste, which includes a comprehensive pro-
gram to handle wastes from the moment it is generated to its
disposal (“cradle-to-grave”).70  Under Subtitle C, the EPA may ei-
ther authorize a state to implement provisions of hazardous waste
requirements or directly implement requirements itself if a state
program does not exist.71  The RCRA sets criteria for “hazardous
waste generators, transporters, and treatment, storage and disposal
facilities.”72  The RCRA also authorizes individuals to sue “any per-
son . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of
any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”73
2. Cases
In Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice v. BNSF
Railway Company,74 several environmental organizations brought an
action against the operators of a rail yard, declaring that the opera-
tor’s activities were in violation of RCRA.75  Specifically, the defend-
ants emitted particulate matter, consisting of solid and liquid
particles suspended in air, from their diesel exhaust engines.76  Al-
though the matter was deemed to be a “toxic air contaminant with
the potential ‘to cause cancer and other adverse health problems,
including respiratory illnesses and increased risk of heart disease,’”
the court determined that the emission of the matter did not con-
stitute “disposal” within the meaning of RCRA.77
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the definition of disposal did
not include the word “emitting,” and because of its exclusion from
the list, the court preliminarily concluded that emitting solid waste
into the air did not fall within the purview of RCRA.78  In addition,
Congress included “emitting” within the definition of “release,” and
thus, it could be presumed that Congress intentionally left off emit-
69. See id. (outlining sections of RCRA).
70. See id. (detailing provisions of RCRA).
71. See id. (discussing enforcement of RCRA).
72. Id. (explaining coverage of RCRA).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (providing language included within RCRA).
74. 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
75. Ctr. for Cmty. Action and Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019,
1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (detailing information regarding action).
76. See id. at 1021 (discussing facts of case).
77. Id. (stating court’s holding).
78. See id. at 1024 (providing rationale for court’s holding regarding statutory
construction).
9
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ting from the definition of disposal.79  The list included terms that
result in specific conduct, namely, placement of solid waste “into or
on any land or water.”80  The court ultimately concluded “that ‘dis-
posal’ occurs where the solid waste is first placed ‘into or on any
land or water’ and is thereafter ‘emitted into the air.’”81
In opposition to the CCAEJ decision, another circuit decision
stressed that RCRA is a “remedial statute that is to be interpreted
broadly.”82  In Little Hocking Water Association, Inc. v. Dupont (Little
Hocking),83 the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio, Eastern Division addressed whether aerial emissions
of the toxic chemical perfluorooctanoic acid (C8), which contami-
nated soil and ground water in the plaintiff’s well field, would be
included within the purview of RCRA.84  The Little Hocking court
determined the facts of CCAEJ to be greatly distinguishable.85  Spe-
cifically, CCAEJ addressed the harms of inhalation of aerial emis-
sions; in contrast, the case at hand deals with the harm resulting in
direct contamination of the land.86  The Little Hocking court did not
find the “intentional gap” made by Congress in regard to aerial
emissions that the CCAEJ court found.87  The Little Hocking court
ultimately concluded that the C8 aerial emissions that contami-
nated the soil and groundwater constituted “disposal” within the
meaning found in the RCRA provision.88
C. The Clean Air Act
In order to protect public health, Congress enacted the Clean
Air Act (CAA) in 1970, and has since made revisions in 1977 and
79. See CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1020 (discussing question of congressional intent
regarding scope of RCRA).
80. See id. at 1024 (elaborating on majority’s rationale).
81. Id. (explaining court’s holding).
82. See Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont Nemours and Co., 91
F. Supp. 3d 940, 963 (D.C. 2015) (providing basis for conflicting circuit decisions).
83. 91 F. Supp. 3d 940 (D.C. 2015).
84. Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Dupont, 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 965 (D.C.
2015) (establishing grounds for action).
85. See id. (stating court’s opinion regarding CCAEJ).
86. See Michael S. Balster & Robert P. Hoffman, Well, How Did It Get Here?
Recent “Air Disposal” Cases Create Liability Uncertainty, PAUL HASTINGS (Apr. 21,
2015), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=0503e469-
2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded (discussing court’s holding).
87. See id. (expounding on gap between CAA and CERCLA).
88. See Little Hocking Water Ass’n, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (discussing court’s
holding).
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1990.89  The CAA “authorizes [the] EPA to establish national ambi-
ent air quality standards.”90  The EPA is authorized to control the
quantity of emissions pollutants from sources, such as chemical
plants, steel mills, and utility production facilities.91  Individual
states are required to monitor air quality and inspect facilities
within their limits to ensure enforcement of the CAA regulations.92
By nature of the regulations established by the EPA, some level of
emissions are allowed, specifically levels of emissions falling below
the threshold set by the EPA.93
The CAA requires the EPA to set the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS).94  The NAAQS directs the EPA Ad-
ministrator to “identify and list ‘air pollutants’ that ‘in his judg-
ment, may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and
welfare’ and whose ‘presence . . . in the ambient air results from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources’ and to issue air
quality criteria for those that are listed.”95  Specifically, the EPA sets
permissible standards for six principal pollutants: carbon monox-
ide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, particle pollution, and sulfur di-
oxide.96  In addition, the EPA is authorized to issue “operating
permits,” called Title V permits, to “major sources” that have “ac-
tual or potential emissions” at levels above the regulatory thresh-
old.97  Businesses with Title V permits must measure the quantity of
pollutants released into the air, minimize these numbers, and peri-
89. See Summary of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-air-act (last visited Jan. 13,
2017) (providing history of CAA).
90. Id. (noting authorization provided by Act).
91. See The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 3
(Apr. 2007), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/
documents/peg.pdf (providing extent of EPA authority).
92. See id. (providing extent of EPA authority).
93. See id. (explaining emission thresholds of CAA).  “[The] EPA sets limits
on certain air pollutants, including setting limits on how much can be in the air
anywhere in the United States.” Id.
94. See NAAQS Table, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/crite-
ria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) (explaining how NAAQS
functions).
95. See Integrated Review Plan for the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Particulate Matter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 452/R-08-004 3 (Mar. 2008),
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data/2008_03_final_integrated_
review_plan.pdf (demonstrating expansive authority granted to EPA).
96. See NAAQS Table, supra note 94 (listing types of pollutants covered within
scope of CAA).
97. See Who Has to Obtain a Title V Permit?, U.S ENVTL.  PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/title-v-operating-permits/who-has-obtain-title-v-permit (last visited
Jan. 13, 2017) (listing facilities required to obtain permits).
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odically report findings.98  Facilities with these permits must annu-
ally report their compliance with the applicable standards, and
must notify the EPA of any failure.99
Although the EPA establishes the air quality standards, en-
forcement occurs at mostly local and state levels.100  The EPA ap-
proves state, local, and tribal agency air pollution reduction
plans.101  If a state fails to meet the requirements of the Act, the
EPA may take control.102  Additionally, the 1990 amendments in-
creased the sanctions the EPA can impose on violators.103
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Pakootas court first considered principles of statutory inter-
pretation, reviewing the text of the statute in question.104  When
the court analyzes whether the language of the statute is to be inter-
preted plainly, it must read the words “in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”105  The court
determined that with a statute such as CERCLA, reviewing the en-
tire statutory scheme is especially important.106  The court found
this review important because the statute contains “a web . . . of
sections, subsections, definitions, exceptions, defenses, and admin-
istrative provisions.”107
The court acknowledged CERCLA’s two primary goals: “(1) to
ensure the prompt and effective cleanup of waste disposal sites, and
(2) to assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances bear
the cost of remedying the conditions they created.”108  More impor-
tantly, the court pointed out that CERCLA itself does not define the
98. See Major Sources of Air Pollution, NORTHWEST CLEAN AIR AGENCY, http://
nwcleanairwa.gov/permits-and-services/major-sources-of-air-pollution/ (last visited
Jan. 13, 2017) (explaining requirements of businesses with Title V permits).
99. See id. (discussing reporting requirements).
100. See Clean Air Act, U.S. LEGAL, INC., http://environmentallaw.uslegal.
com/federal-laws/clean-air-act/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017) (explaining scope of
EPA authority).
101. See id. (discussing how EPA regulates in area).
102. See id. (explaining when EPA can become involved).
103. See id. (highlighting potential liability).
104. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir.
2016) (explaining court’s preliminary analysis).
105. See id. (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)) (discussing
how language within statute should be interpreted in light of placement within
entire statutory scheme).
106. See id. (discussing why interpretation of entire statutory scheme is partic-
ularly important in context).
107. See id. (providing explanation of detailed network of provisions within
CERCLA).
108. See id. at 981 (explaining purposes of statute).
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word “disposal,” but instead relies on the definition within
RCRA.109  RCRA defines “disposal” as, “[t]he discharge, deposit, in-
jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters . . . .”110
Among other elements, one must have “disposed” of, or ar-
ranged for “disposal” of, hazardous substances in order to be found
liable for CERCLA remediation.111  The issue before the court was
ultimately whether Teck arranged for “disposal” of hazardous sub-
stances by emitting substances into the air.112  The Plaintiffs argued
various definitions of the term “deposit,” which the RCRA includes
in its definition of “disposed.”113  The court, despite acknowledging
the Plaintiff’s reasonable argument, pointed out that it was not
“writing on a blank slate.”114
The Carson Harbor court interpreted the terms “deposit” and
“disposal” to be “akin to ‘putting down,’ or placement by some-
one.”115  Further, the CCAEJ court noted that Congress could have
used the word “emit,” but chose not to.116  In addition, Congress
included the term “emitting” alongside “disposing” within the defi-
nition of “release” in RCRA, suggesting that Congress did not in-
tend to interpret “emission” as “disposal.”117
Although the CCAEJ court’s interpretation of “disposal” within
RCRA did not foreclose a potentially different interpretation within
CERCLA, the Pakootas court nonetheless found the CCAEJ court’s
109. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 981 (including definition found within another
statute).
110. See id. (defining “disposal”).
111. See id. at 981 (explaining elements that must be proven to be found lia-
ble under CERCLA).  In order to prevail plaintiffs must prove that the site is a
“facility” within the meaning of CERCLA, a “release” from that facility occurred,
and the defendant falls within one of the four broad classes of “potentially respon-
sible parties.” See id.
112. See id. at 983 (describing main issue for court to decide).
113. See id. (reiterating plaintiff’s argument for defining “disposal”).
114. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983 (explaining premise for court’s rejection of
plaintiff’s argument).
115. See id. (quoting Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d
863, 879, 879 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001)) (explaining another court’s interpretation).
“[N]othing in the context of the statute or the term ‘disposal’ suggests that Con-
gress meant to include chemical or geologic processes or passive migration.” See
id.
116. See id. at 984 (citing CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1021) (discussing another court’s
rationale for interpretation).
117. See id. (addressing Congress’ placement of words within statute).
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interpretation of “disposal” persuasive.118  Although the Plaintiffs
stressed the broad remedial purpose of CERCLA, the court pointed
out that its interpretation of the language must “still be grounded
in the statute’s text and structure.”119
The court also addressed the Plaintiff’s argument pointing out
that Teck’s interpretation of the word would render the federally
permitted release provision to be surplusage.120  The court ac-
knowledged the possibility that Congress intended for CERCLA to
apply to emissions up until the point where it ran into the CAA;
federally permitted “release,” however, could also be read as refer-
ring to emissions as releases, and not as a form of disposal.121  The
court relied on the latter argument.122
Lastly, the court noted that the Plaintiff’s interpretation of “dis-
posal” would produce problematic results.123  If aerial depositions
are considered disposals, then it essentially eliminates the innocent
landowner defense, which allows defendants to argue that the dis-
posal or placement of the hazardous substance took place before
the “potentially responsible party” (PRPs) acquired the property.124
Specifically, PRPs are liable for “disposal” or “contamination” that
takes place while they own the property.125  Conversely, innocent
landowners face liability for aerial emissions that float and finally
deposit on the land or water while they are in possession of the
118. See id. (explaining plaintiffs offered no reason to interpret “disposal”
differently).
119. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (citing CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct.
2175, 2185 (2014)) (explaining why court should not divert from statutory
analysis).
120. See id. (explaining premise of plaintiff’s “federally permitted release” ar-
gument).  The statute provides:
(10) The term “federally permitted release” means . . . (H) any emis-
sion into the air subject to a permit or control regulation under section
111 [42 U.S.C.A. § 7411], section 112 [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], Title I part C
[42 U.S.C.A. § 7470 et seq.], Title I part D [42 U.S.C.A. § 7501 et seq.], or
State implementation plans submitted in accordance with section 110 of
the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7410] (and not disapproved by the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), including any
schedule or waiver granted, promulgated, or approved under these
sections.
42 U.S.C. 9601(10)(H) (providing language of statute in question).
121. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (explaining alternative interpretation).
122. See id. (providing court’s accepted argument).
123. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s problematic interpretation).
124. See id. (explaining rationale).
125. See id. (clarifying explanation).
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property, even if a different party initially emitted the hazardous
substances.126
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. Incorrect Reliance on Precedent
1. Carson Harbor
The court premised its holding primarily on the theory that
the Carson Harbor decision was dispositive; therefore, that holding
bound the Pakootas court’s decision.127  The Carson Harbor facts,
however, differ substantially from the case at hand.128  In Carson
Harbor, the plaintiffs discovered “tar-like and slag materials,” which
was “a by-product of petroleum production,” on their property by
previous owners.129  The court ultimately concluded that passive
migration of the substances would not constitute disposal, and,
thus, current owners would not be liable.130  Instead, the previous
owners, who “discharge[d], deposit[ed], inject[ed], dump[ed],
spill[ed], leak[ed], or plac[ed]” the hazardous substances on the
property would be liable.131  The court included a number of opin-
ions holding that absent direct human involvement, passive or grad-
ual spread of a contaminant would not be considered “disposal”
within the meaning of CERCLA.132
In contrast, Pakootas involved actual emission of hazardous sub-
stances from the Teck smokestacks, not a passive and accidental mi-
gration of the substance through the ground due to a spill or
leakage.133  The court in Pakootas was not looking to relieve a subse-
quent owner of remediation costs from an uninvolved movement of
substances, but instead, it was looking to hold responsible a current
126. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (explaining how interpretation is
problematic).
127. See id. at 983 (explaining court’s rationale).  The court stated, “Our en
banc court in Carson Harbor and a prior panel in [CCAEJ] earlier interpreted the
terms ‘deposit’ and ‘disposal.’” See id.
128. See generally Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 867-70 (providing background for
action).
129. See id. at 868 (discussing underlying facts).
130. For a further discussion of the court’s rationale in Carson Harbor, see
supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
131. See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 875 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)) (ex-
panding on holding).
132. See id. at 875-76 (providing cases with similar holdings).
133. Compare Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 978, with Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 868
(demonstrating different facts between two cases).
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owner who directly emitted the substances into the air, which later
settled on land.134
In addition, the Pakootas court relied on the Carson Harbor
court’s interpretation of “disposal,” describing it as “ ‘akin to put-
ting down.’”135  As the court held, because aerial emissions were
not “placed” or “put down” under the definition provided by Carson
Harbor, they should be excluded from the purview of CERCLA.136
The Pakootas court inappropriately analogized passive migration of
hazardous substances to those substances that float through the air
from aerial emissions.137  In sum, the Carson Harbor court premised
their interpretation of “disposal” based on facts involving a passive,
and likely accidental, migration of hazardous substances.138  In this
case, Teck was the ultimate “emitter” of the substances, and there
was no “passive” conduct on their part.139
2. CCAEJ
While the facts in Carson Harbor are substantially different from
Pakootas, the facts in CCAEJ are very similar.140 CCAEJ involved an
interpretation of “disposal” within the context of RCRA, rather
than CERCLA.141  It is important to distinguish the differences be-
tween the two statutes: RCRA involves management of solid and
hazardous wastes while owners and operators are actively using or
disposing of hazardous wastes, while CERCLA is used for remedia-
tion from past contamination.142  The court in CCAEJ opined that
where RCRA fails to cover aerial emissions, the CAA will make up
for the lack of coverage depending on whether the substance will
be included within the defined hazardous air pollutants in the
134. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 978 (explaining differences between positions of
parties in two cases).
135. See id. at 983 (providing rationale for relying on precedent).
136. See id. (applying Carson Harbor interpretation to case at issue).
137. See Peter Hayes, Superfund Aerial Deposit Ruling: Did Court Get it Right?,
BLOOMBERG BNA 1,1 (Aug. 4, 2016), http://law.lclark.edu/live/files/22242-
superfund-aerial-deposit-ruling-did-court-get-it (discussing difference between pas-
sive migration and active emission).
138. For a further discussion of “passive” migration, see supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
139. See Hayes, supra note 137, at 1 (demonstrating different level of culpabil-
ity).   “Teck was an emitter—it wasn’t passive movement. That should be adequate
to be disposal.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Compare Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 868, with CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1020
(discussing differences and similarities in underlying facts between cases).
141. See CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1020 (providing context of action).
142. For a further discussion on RCRA and CERCLA, see supra notes 42-73
and accompanying text.
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CAA.143  In some instances, the CAA will not cover certain air pollu-
tants.144  Ultimately, CCAEJ is not binding on the Pakootas court’s
decision, as it is an interpretation of a word found in an entirely
different statute, with an entirely different purpose.145
B. Disregard for Purpose of the Statute
1. Broad Remediation
The purpose of the enactment of CERCLA is clear: “ ‘to pro-
mote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that
the costs of such cleanup efforts [are] bourne by those responsible
for the contamination.’”146  Due to its remedial nature, CERCLA is
known for its all-encompassing liability coverage.147  The purpose is
ultimately to prevent the release of hazardous substances through
the long-lasting potential for liability on the responsible parties.148
In addition, CERCLA “provides a strict, joint and several, and retro-
active liability scheme.”149  By not subjecting aerial emissions of haz-
ardous substances to CERCLA liability, the court undermined the
intent of the legislature to prevent releases of hazardous substances,
and, instead, encourages emitters to continue to release substances
in airborne ways.150
2. Federal Permit Shield
In CCAEJ, the court held that aerial emissions were not within
the purview of RCRA.151  As mentioned, the Pakootas court specifi-
143. See generally CCAEJ, 764 F.3d at 1026-29 (providing overview of amend-
ments to CAA and RCRA, and coverage of both acts).
144. See id. (explaining scope of coverage).
145. For a further discussion on differences between CERCLA and RCRA, see
supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
146. See Dyke, Tracing The Supreme Court’s Treatment of CERCLA, LAW360 (June
24, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/671890/tracing-the-supreme-court-s-
treatment-of-cercla (quoting Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. U.S., 556
U.S. 599 (2009)) (providing purpose of CERCLA).
147. See id. (highlighting expansive effect of CERCLA).
148. See CERCLA Liability as a Pollution Prevention Strategy, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 131, 132 (1993) (describing preventative nature of CERCLA).
149. See id. (explaining expansive scope of CERCLA liability).
150. See McCall and Hastings, Ninth Circuit Holds Air Emissions Not Covered by
CERCLA, MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LAWFLASH (July 29, 2016), https://www.mor
ganlewis.com/pubs/ninth-circuit-holds-air-emissions-not-covered-by-cercla (dem-
onstrating exclusion of aerial emissions contradicts congressional intent).  “Going
forward, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) at CERCLA sites will be able to rely
on Pakootas to contest their liability for response costs or natural resource damages
related to contamination caused by aerial deposition.” See id.
151. For a further discussion of the CCAEJ holding, see supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
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cally excludes from CERCLA liability, any aerial emissions that later
settle on land.152  CERCLA, however, explicitly defines “hazardous
substances” to include “any hazardous air pollutant listed under sec-
tion 112 of the Clean Air Act.”153  In addition, CERCLA defines
“federally permitted release[s]” to include “any emission into the
air subject to a permit or control regulation under section[s] . . . of
the Clean Air Act.”154  This definition suggests that CERCLA does
not cover emissions that are permitted by federal regulations, but,
instead, covers prohibited emissions.155  The language of the statute
implies that so long as the party’s emissions comply with a CAA per-
mit and later settle on another’s property, the owner of said prop-
erty cannot seek cleanup remediation costs from the emitter.156
While non-permitted aerial emissions of hazardous substances
could be subject to CERCLA liability, it is difficult to identify these
emissions after finally settling.157  Failure to include this type of cir-
cumstance within the coverage of CERCLA can ultimately have det-
rimental effects on the environment and any subsequent owners of
land.158  Unfortunately, these owners will not be able to seek
remediation costs from the original emitters.159
152. For a further discussion on the Pakootas court’s holding, see supra notes
104-126 and accompanying text.
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 14(E) (defining “hazardous substances”).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 10(H) (providing exceptions to CERCLA liability).
155. See id. (clarifying scope of definition to specify prohibited emissions); see
also Barry M. Hartman, Perrin Q. Dargan, III, Christopher A. Jaros, & Elizabeth M.
Elliott, An Air of Change in CERCLA Liability? Pakootas v. Teck Cominco and CERCLA’s
Federal Permit Shield, K&L GATES (June 27, 2016), http://www.klgates.com/an-air-
of-change-in-cercla-liability-ipakootas-v-teck-comincoi-and-cerclas-federal-permit-
shield-06-27-2016/ (describing implications of language in statute).
156. See Hartman, et al., supra note 155 (describing how “Federal Permit
Shield” works within context of CERCLA).
157. See id. (addressing difficulties with distinguishing between federally per-
mitted deposits and federally prohibited deposits).  The authors state:
Under this interpretation, where a party’s emissions include a con-
stituent that is not identified in the permit or otherwise regulated by the
Clean Air Act, even if that party’s emissions (including the unregulated
substance) are in full compliance with the permit and other regulatory
requirements, that party could arguably be liable under CERCLA if the
constituent later settles on property elsewhere and results in the incur-
rence of costs recoverable under CERCLA.
Id.  The Ninth Circuit ultimately undermines this argument by excluding all aerial
emissions from CERCLA liability. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 978 (explaining court’s
disregard for permitted versus non-permitted aerial emissions).
158. See generally Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 980 (explaining environmental impacts
of aerial emissions that later settle on land and water).
159. For a further discussion on the limited scope of CERCLA liability, see
supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
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VI. IMPACT
When Pakootas was brought before the Ninth Circuit, the court
had the power to pave a new path for a theory of liability for hazard-
ous waste emitters or to ignore aerial emissions altogether.160  The
court chose the latter, creating a new option for firms to dispose of
wastes in a less expensive way.161  By denying aerial emissions cover-
age within CERCLA, firms that emit wastes into the air no longer
need to worry about potential remediation costs when those wastes
later settle onto land or water.162  While slag waste from smelting
creates both solid and gaseous byproducts, other types of hazardous
waste may come in only gaseous form.163  These emitters will never
have to pay for remediation costs, so long as their emissions abide
by the requirements set forth in the CAA.164  In the event their
emissions do not abide by the requirements set forth in the CAA, it
will be nearly impossible to separate the emissions that were feder-
ally permitted from the emissions that surpassed the allotted
amount when examining the deposits after settling.165  There is po-
tential for hazardous waste emitters to seek out new forms of dispo-
sal that result in aerial emissions, rather than solid emissions.166
The court determined that “passive migration” of aerial emis-
sions would not fit the definition of “disposal” within CERCLA.167
Emitters will only be held liable for “sudden” aerial emissions, re-
gardless of whether the emissions are purposeful or accidental.168
As long as an emitter can alter the process, so that the emissions are
slow in nature or “passive,” they will not be held liable for later
remediation costs.169  This interpretation disregards the culpability
160. See Hartman et al., supra note 155 (discussing potential results of court’s
interpretation).
161. See id. (expanding on effects of court’s decision).
162. See id. (discussing federal permit shields impact of limiting liability).
163. See Learn the Basics of Hazardous Waste, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/hw/learn-basics-hazardous-waste (last visited Jan.
13, 2017) (describing various forms of hazardous waste).
164. For a further discussion of the federal permit shield created by the CAA
and CERCLA, see supra notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
165. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 150 (discussing difficulties court will
face).
166. For a further discussion on the limits of liability due to aerial emissions,
see supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
167. For a further discussion on the court’s interpretation of “passive migra-
tion,” see supra notes 127-139 and accompanying text.
168. See Aerial Deposition of Hazardous Substances – A Look at Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., BICK LAW LLP (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.bicklawllp.com/
our-insights/aerial-deposition-hazardous-substances-look-pakootas-v-teck-cominco-
metals-ltd/ (summarizing effects of court’s decision).
169. See id. (clarifying interpretation).
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of emitters and undermines the court’s reasoning in Carson Harbor,
a case in which the emissions were likely accidental.170
By creating this gap between CERCLA liability and require-
ments of the CAA, the court ignores potential detrimental effects
on the environment.171  Individuals suffering from a destroyed
habitat due to slag build-up, or other similar wastes from these ae-
rial emissions, will not only have to find the capital to clean up their
environments, but will also be exposed to further contamination by
the growth of firms seeking to avoid remediation costs by utilizing
aerial emission of wastes.172
In addition, legal scholars have noted that the term “disposal”
appears several times throughout CERCLA, thus, the interpretation
in this context will likely affect the interpretation of “disposal”
within the rest of the statute.173  Specifically, “ ‘disposal’” can be
found in the definitions of “ ‘facility’” and “‘release.’”174  This clari-
fied definition could ultimately impact whether a facility will be
deemed a “CERCLA facility.”175  Extensive litigation regarding des-
ignation of CERCLA liability will likely follow.176
Further, this decision contradicts agency designations of “CER-
CLA facilities.”177  CERCLA liability has already been imposed on a
number of facilities where disposal of hazardous substances has
been, at least in part, due to aerial emissions.178  In previous cases,
aerial emissions have already been treated as hazardous waste
170. For a further discussion on active or accidental conduct by emitters, see
supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
171. For a further discussion on environmental effects of slag build-up, see
supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
172. For a further discussion on victim property owners’ inability to seek
remediation costs from emitters, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
173. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 150 (discussing appearance of “dis-
posal” within CERCLA).  “The Court noted that its interpretation of the term ‘dis-
posal’ for ‘purposes of whether Teck can be held liable for arranging for the
disposal of hazardous substances ‘has ripple effects’ throughout the rest’ of CER-
CLA, given the use of that term in multiple provisions in the statute.”  Meline G.
MacCurdy, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SEC-
TION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND RESOURCES (Sept. 11, 2016), http://www.ameri
canbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/committees/snrdl_regional_
updates/20160811_pakootas_v_teck_cominco_metals_ltd.html (describing ripple
effect of interpretation).
174. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 150 (discussing where “disposal” can
be found within CERCLA).
175. See id. (discussing impact of clarifying “disposal”).
176. See id. (expanding on impact).
177. See id. (describing decision’s effect on previous cases).
178. See id. (discussing previous treatment of aerial emissions in designating
CERCLA facilities).
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disposals within the purview of CERCLA.179  The PRPs in those
cases are more likely to seek reimbursement of expenditures dedi-
cated to remediation costs of cleanups for aerial emissions.180  It
will be extremely difficult for courts to develop a method of distin-
guishing between solid slag emissions and aerial emissions at the
deposited sites.181
Due to contradicting interpretations of arranger liability in in-
terpreting “disposal,” it is likely that the Plaintiffs will petition to the
Supreme Court for certiorari.182  In the event the Supreme Court
decides to hear the case, it will be the first time the Court interprets
an aspect of arranger liability since 2009.183  Given the Supreme
Court’s history of limiting the liability of emitting parties, it is likely
that the Court will find the Ninth Circuit’s opinion persuasive.184
While originally drafted as a far-reaching piece of legislation, CER-
CLA continues to be limited in scope.185  As polluting parties con-
tinue to create ways to bypass cleanup responsibilities, a response by
the legislature will be necessary to hold them accountable.186
Holly J. Sofield*
179. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 150 (discussing previous treatment
of aerial emissions within CERCLA liability prior to Pakootas).
180. See id. (describing how PRPs will contest previously held liability).
181. See id. (noting difficulty courts will face in distinguishing types of slag).
182. Compare Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 981, with Little Hocking, 91 F. Supp. 3d at
961 (demonstrating two interpretations of “disposal”).
183. See McCall and Hastings, supra note 150 (discussing recent history of Su-
preme Court CERCLA decision).  In the 2009 decision, Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the scope of arranger
liability, and created the “divisibility defense” to liability when a CERCLA action is
brought against a party. Id.
184. For a further discussion of the judicial limitations of CERCLA scope, see
supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text.
185. See id. (discussing Pakootas decision effects on CERCLA liability).
186. See id. (detailing aerial emissions loophole and further necessary action).
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